This study examines pay differences between comparable workers in state and local governments and in private firms in the same state. Using a pooled sample of national census data (ACS 2001(ACS -2006, we test whether private/public pay differential exists at the state and local levels and whether such differentials are race and gender dependent. Additionally, using 1990 and 2000 PUMS data, we assess whether such differentials are increasing or decreasing over time. Economist generally find that public employees are paid more than comparable private-sector employees, but research on public/private pay differentials at the state level is scarce. We find that that most SLGs pay less than private firms in the same state for similar workers. This is especially true for white men and Asians. Blacks and Latinos earn more in the public than private sector. Suggested future research is discussed.
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Pay comparability is a long-standing principle of public sector compensation.
Paying public employees competitively with private sector employees ensures that neither civil servants nor taxpayers are exploited by political determination of public sector pay (Smith, 1977) . The 16.5 million full time equivalent state and local government (SLG) employees comprise about 14% of the nation's employees 1 and receive a monthly payroll of about $65 billion. Excessive compensation wastes taxpayer resources while insufficient compensation hampers recruitment and retention of an effective workforce. Despite its obvious importance, pay comparability has proved exceedingly elusive to achieve. Research on SLG employees generally shows that any public employee pay premium is smaller at the state and local than at the federal level.
White males generally earn less in SLGs than they do in the private sector. Minorities do better in the public sector than they do in the private sector. Public pay premiums for white females are small or nonexistent.
Nonetheless, many questions about SLG employee compensation remain unanswered. How are SLG pay premiums or deficits distributed among the states? Do pay patterns differ by race or gender? How have pay patterns changed over time-are we moving in the right direction? This provides more answers to state and local budget officials and adds to the body of knowledge on the relationship between private and public pay at the state and local level. We address these questions by analyzing census data from 1990, 2000, and 2001-2006 . Using OLS regression and wage decomposition Efforts at pay comparability are motivated by the observations of public managers that public-sector compensation lags substantially behind the private sector hampering recruitment of qualified candidates and increasing turnover, particularly among highly-performing employees (Nigro, Nigro, & Kellough, 1994; Trevor, Gerhart, & Boudreau, 1997 ). Yet despite largely ineffective efforts, as perceived by policy makers, to raise public pay to private pay levels, research by economists repeatedly finds public employees overcompensated relative to the private sector (Smith, 1977) . Median salaries for public employees are higher than median salaries in the private sector. This is not surprising since public employees tend to be better educated and have more work experience than private employees. Economists, nonetheless, argue that public employees are overpaid despite higher education and more experience, particularly at the federal level. Part of the public pay paradox is attributable to the significantly higher pay, relative to white males, received by women and minorities in the public sector.
Since race and gender should be irrelevant in determining compensation, should they be included as factors in predicting compensation, especially since the passage of equal pay and civil rights legislation in the 1960s. The existence of market-wide wage discrimination continues to be debated.
Research on SLG employees generally shows that public employee pay premiums are smaller at the state and local than at the federal level. Moreover, white males generally earn less in SLG than they do in the private sector but minorities do better in the public sector than they do in the private sector. Public pay premiums for white females are small or nonexistent.
Nonetheless, many questions about SLG employee compensation relative to the private sector remain unanswered. How are SLG pay premiums or deficits distributed among the states? Do pay patterns differ by race or gender? How have pay patterns changed over time-are we moving in the right direction? This paper begins the process of providing these answers to state and local budget officials and to add to the body of knowledge on the relationship between private and public pay at the state and local level. We seek to address these questions by analyzing census data from 1990, 2000, and 2001-2006 . Using OLS regression and wage decomposition techniques, we measure trends in pay parity over time. National and intra-state private and public wage differentials by both race and gender and report the results. We confirm earlier findings of major racial and gender differences in pay comparability. White males receive little, if any, public pay premium, but minorities and women are paid more than their privatesector counterparts. However, it is unclear whether this differential is the result of public-sector overcompensation or private-sector discrimination. Premiums and deficits 6 vary substantially by state, but there is little evidence that premiums are trending in either direction over time.
Research on state and local public-private pay differentials is sparse compared to similar research at the federal level. There are numerous studies of federal and private sector employee pay differences (e.g., Belman & Heywood, 1993; Bender, 1998; Langbein & Lewis, 1998; Lee, 2004; Moulton, 1990) . Other research examines this relationship at multiple levels of government (Belman & Heywood, 1989 , 2004b Borjas, 2002a; Gyourko & Tracy, 1988; Smith, 1977) . Still other research examines publicprivate pay parity internationally (Adamchik & Bedi, 2000; Borland, Hirschberg, & Lye, 1998; Elliott & Duffus, 1996; Mueller, 1998; Papapetrou, 2006 ). Yet to date, no study has comprehensively considered SLG pay parity issues. Such a study should, at a minimum, consider SLG pay parity over time and by race and gender. Since SLG employees are not paid uniformly, individual state differences should also be considered.
Much public-private pay comparability research conducted by economists finds public pay premiums at the federal, state and local levels of government that persist after controlling for human capital and occupational differences (Smith, 1977) . More recent research conducted by economists tends to confirm Smith's original finding but suggests that public pay premiums are less substantial than Smith reports (Belman & Heywood, 1989; Gyourko & Tracy, 1988; Moore & Raisian, 1991; Moulton, 1990) . Using Current Population Survey (CPS) data, Hundley (1991) finds that the state and local public sector exhibits more pay compression than the private sector and that jobs that exist only in the public sector pay more than the characteristics of their workers would 7 predict. Others confirm that the public pay premium exists mostly for lower paid workers. Higher-paid, white-collar public employees suffer a pay deficiency. Pay compression in the public sector results in the overcompensation of employees paid below the mean and the under compensation of employees paid above the mean (Fogel & Lewin, 1973; Hundley, 1991; Miller, 1996) .
[S]tate sector[s] compress earnings, underpaying at the high end of the hierarchy but overpaying at the low end. Furthermore, when the different composition of the state sector is accounted for, the average earnings in the state sector are a few percentage points above what they would be in the private sector. The local sector seems to engage in the same compression of earnings but, given its work force and mix of occupations, average earnings are below what local workers could expect in the private sector (Belman & Heywood, 1995, p. 194) .
Gender and race are also factors affecting public-private pay comparability.
Many researchers assume that the private pay rate is the market rate and that deviations from the private rate represent over-or under-compensation of public employees.
However, Asher and Popkin (1994) demonstrate that perceived overcompensation of postal workers results from women and minorities being paid as much as comparable white males in the public sector and significantly less than comparable white males in the private sector. They conclude that white males are paid the market rate in both sectors and that minorities and women are paid the market rate only in the public sector. Llorens, Wenger & Kellough (2008) reach a similar conclusion, finding that higher levels of minority and female employment in state bureaucracies may be the result of public pay premiums for both groups. Choudhury (1994) reaches the opposite conclusion, however, finding that that women face more discrimination in the public 8 sector. Public employment may be a less discriminatory labor environment and is, therefore, preferred by women and minorities. As such, any consideration of SLG pay parity should consider both gender and race.
Research on how public-private pay differences vary by state is relatively sparse.
Most early studies of state and local wage differentials rely on national data and report only aggregate results, or report results only by governmental sector (federal, state and local) (Moore & Raisian, 1991) . 2 Early work by Belman and Heywood (1995) analyzed state and local wage differentials in Wisconsin and compared them to six other states using pooled Current Population Survey data from 1989-1991 . They conclude that pay premiums vary considerably by state. Human capital differences also appear to contribute to differences in compensation between the sectors. Human capital refers to assets possessed by employees that to increase their value as workers and includes work experience and education. Much of the public wage premium appears due to human capital advantages enjoyed by public-sector employees, again duplicating other findings (Llorens, 2008a) . They also find that wage differentials vary considerably by state.
Within their sample, California has a large public-sector premium and Mississippi a large deficit.
Using 1990 Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) 5% census data, Kroncke and Long (1998) calculate the public-private earnings ratios by state separately for males and females in 1989, both for mean earnings and for expected earnings based on regression wage equations that controlled for education, race, experience, hours worked and ten occupational categories. Both males and females had higher mean wages in 9 SLGs, with females having the greater advantage. The mean earnings of men in SLGs range from 89% to 120% of the mean earnings of private-sector employees in the same state. The mean earnings of women are larger in the public sector in every state ranging from 115% to 150%. When human capital and limited occupational differences were included, public sector males were paid about 13% less than comparable private-sector employees and women were paid about 2% more than their private sector counterparts.
Depending on the state, men earned 78% to 106% as much in state government as in the private sector; women made 88% to 123% as much in state as in private employment.
After controlling for human capital and occupational difference, females continued to show a slight public-sector pay advantage in most states whereas men almost always made less in state government. Thus, when accounting for human-capital differences between private and public-sector employees, there appears to be a public-sector wage disadvantage for white males and a slight advantage for black males and women among statistically comparable workers.
Using the 1980 PUMS 5% data, Singell (1991) analyzes the public and private sector compensation of black and white males in 41 states. He concludes that, after controlling for human capital factors, wage differentials for blacks and whites exist in both the public and private sectors but notes that the black-white wage differential is larger in the private sector. Using CPS rather than PUMS data, Llorens (2008a) measures the SLG-private wage gap in the aggregate from 1987 to 2002 and by state for 1987 , 1994 and 2002 . Like Kroncke and Long (1998 , Llorens measures public private pay differences by state and gender. Lorens also finds substantial variation among states in public-private pay ratios but disagrees with Kroncke and Long on whether the pay gap is increasing or decreasing over time. Moreover, while Kroncke and Long report a female wage premium of 2.5 percentage points and a male wage deficit of 13 percentage points for 1989, Llorens reports a female premium of 5 points and a male deficiency of only 3 points for 1987. To some extent, these differences may be due to differences in variables included in their respective regression equations 3 and to the use of different data sets; however, weak correlations between the state ratios are more troubling.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
As Table 1 shows, the correlations of state pay equity ratios are surprisingly low. The correlation of adjusted 4 pay equity ratios for males between the studies is .23.
Surprisingly the lowest correlation is between the within study correlation of male and female pay equity ratios in the Kroncke and Long study of .15, suggesting little consistency in pay patterns for males and females. There appears to be little agreement between the only two studies specifically analyzing state private public pay equity issues in all 50 states. 5 Belman, Heywood and Voos (2002) 
Research Questions
Only two relatively recent studies present complete intra-state pay parity analyses and both omit race as a factor. Moreover, correlations of the ordering of differentials by state reveal little agreement between the two. In fact, the studies disagree on whether pay parity is increasing or decreasing over time. Thus, we derive three principal research questions.
On average, do SLG employees make more than comparable private-sectors employees and how has this relationship evolved over time?
The current literature is inconclusive on whether state and local employees are paid a wage premium and whether payment patterns are changing over time.
On average, do patterns of public pay differentials vary by race and gender?
Research also appears to suggest that the public sector wage patterns differ by gender.
Females may tend to receive a slight premium while white males suffer a slight deficiency (Kroncke & Long, 1998; Llorens, 2008a) . Studies also suggest that African Americans are paid more in the public sector than the private, suggesting that the public sector discriminates less (Asher & Popkin, 1984; Singell, 1991) . No study has simultaneously considered both the effects of race and gender on pay equity at the SLG level. Llorens et al. (2008b) Accurate information about state and local pay policies, particularly sub-divided by race and gender, assists policy makers in assessing pay equity issues and avoiding potential allegations of employment discrimination.
How does intra-state SLG pay parity vary by state and by race and gender?
Information on SLG pay parity is relevant to SLG compensation policies. Knowledge that that SLG employees are over-or under-paid nationally is largely irrelevant to state and local budget official and legislators. For them, the relevant comparison for is the within state.
Data and Methods
To assess trends in SLG-private pay disparities, we use the 1990 PUMS, the 2000 PUMS, and the combined 2005 and 2006 American Community Surveys. We restrict 13 the samples to full-time, full-year employees of private, for-profit firms and state and local governments (SLGs). That is, we drop the self-employed, federal employees, and those who work for nonprofit organizations. We also drop those who worked fewer than 48 weeks in the prior year or less than 40 hours in a typical week.
Our dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual earnings. We do not distinguish state from local government employees: we combine them into a single dummy variable for some analyses and into a single sub-sample for other analyses. We restrict the sample to African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, and non-Hispanic whites. In some analyses, we use seven dummy variables to distinguish each sub-group (e.g., black men, Hispanic women) from non-Hispanic white men, the reference group; we run other analyses separately for the eight groups. We also add dummy variables to distinguish those with disabilities that affect their ability to work, those with limited English ability, naturalized citizens, and other immigrants.
We measure education in years, but we also add four dummy variables for those whose highest degree is a college diploma, a master's, a doctorate, or a professional degree; coefficients on these variables represent additional effects beyond what is estimated for that many years of education.
We estimate years of work experience as Age -Years of , that is, as current age minus estimated age at completion of schooling. This is a real weakness of Census data, as some people continue or return to their schooling after beginning fulltime work and thus have more work experience than we estimate; others take time out of the labor force and have less experience than we estimate. On average, we expect women to have less real work experience than men with the same level of estimated work experience, but this should not affect our findings much, especially in analyses 14 performed separately by sex. If SLG and private sector employees have different levels of real experience at the same levels of estimated experience, it will bias our findings, but we see little reason to believe that is true. Dummy variables for relationship status (married, living with an opposite-sex partner, living with a same-sex partner, and currently unpartnered) and for the presence of children in the home may also provide information on attachment to the labor force. Many of these variables have different effects by sex (e.g., marriage and parenthood tend to increase men's earnings but decrease women's, women with same-sex partners earn more than married women but the opposite is true for men). These differences should be captured in the analyses performed separately by race and sex. We also add 25 dummy variables for broad occupational categories. 6 In some ways this controls for differences in types of education and work experience.
Occupational choice also implies decisions about what pay levels one will receive -pay differences may provide compensating differentials for differences in work conditions or In a later analysis, we perform separate analyses for each broad occupational grouping in which the private sector employees between 50% and 90% of the workers. In these analyses, we include dummy variables for each detailed occupation provided by the Census. This is computationally impractical in the full data set. in the intrinsic interest or value of the work. Occupation is not a free choice, however, as employers must sometimes hire or promote one into a particular occupation (e.g., manager), so controlling for occupation is a somewhat conservative approach.
Occupational differences across sectors present real challenges to pay comparability: elementary school teachers, police officers, and firefighters are rare in for-profit firms and salespeople are uncommon in SLGs.
We use three methods to estimate SLG-private pay differences. Method 1 combines SLG and for-profit employees into the same regression analysis and uses a dummy variable to identify SLG employees. With the natural logarithm of annual earnings as the dependent variable, the coefficient on this variable roughly represents the proportional difference in pay from a private sector employee of the same race, sex, level of education and work experience, working in the same occupation and living in the same state. Because the regression coefficients somewhat over-state negative differences and under-state positive ones, we transform them to expected percentage differences in earnings by exponentiating, subtracting 1, and multiplying times 100. As previous research suggests that the pay effects of SLG employment vary by race, sex, occupation, and educational level, we also run these regressions separately for our eight race-sex groups and run some models by occupation and educational level.
A key weakness of Method 1 is that it assumes that the SLG and private sectors value all characteristics the same. Previous research demonstrates that race and gender pay disparities tend to be smaller in government, however, and that the private sector has increased pay more rapidly for the more educated than has the public sector.
Method 2 therefore runs separate regressions for SLG and for-profit employees.
Coefficients on all variables can therefore differ between the two sectors, representing different "pay structures." The size of the expected sectoral pay difference can therefore vary widely across individuals based on their characteristics, making it difficult to summarize the size of the effect. (Method 1 assumes that the proportional pay difference is the same at every combination of values of the independent variables, and that difference is captured by the SLG Employee regression coefficient.)
The Oaxaca method takes advantage of the well-known property of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression that when all of the independent variables are at their means, the expected value of the dependent variable is also at its mean. Oaxaca developed the method to estimate the average pay difference between comparable men and women.
Multiplying the mean values of the independent variables for the men times the coefficients on those variables in the male-only equation and summing yields the mean earnings for the men; multiplying the female means times the male coefficients yields women's mean expected pay if they had the same "pay structure" as men. The difference between these two expected values can be attributed to differences between men's and women's mean characteristics (presumably a legitimate pay difference) and any difference between women's expected pay using men's pay structure and their actual mean pay can be attributed to different reward structures (presumably an illegitimate pay difference). Unfortunately, one might just as logically divide legitimate and illegitimate pay differences by multiplying men's and women's means times the female coefficients. This yields somewhat different estimates, resulting in the wellknown index problem.
Method 2 uses a variation on the Oaxaca method. We run separate regressions for SLG and private sector employees, calculate everyone's expected pay from both models, calculate the percentage difference in each person's expected pay between the SLG and private sectors, and calculate the mean of those percentage differences. This weights every person equally and is less arbitrary than using the means for the full group, for SLG employees, or for private sector employees.
On the other hand, the real question may not be whether everyone would earn about the same amount in both sectors, but whether SLG employees earn about what they would earn in the private sector. That is, Method 2 allows that each person's expected pay difference between the sectors could be different, based on whether they have characteristics valued more highly by one sector or the other. Individuals presumably have some awareness of their value in the two markets and choose their sector accordingly. People with master's degrees in early childhood education or with extensive experience in law enforcement, for instance, should recognize that their education and experience are more likely to be rewarded in SLGs, whereas crack salespeople will expect to find jobs that reward their skills more highly in the private sector. If our goal is to pay SLG employees in line with their market value, then our focus should perhaps only be on SLG employees.
Method 3 therefore follows Method 2 up to the last stage, but it calculates the mean of the percentage differences in expected pay between the sectors only for SLG employees. This is similar to what evaluation people call the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT). It calculates the expected difference in pay for those who actually choose SLG employment rather than for everyone. This probably makes the most sense, though it ignores workers that state and local governments might want to attract but currently do not. One explanation given for the discrepancies in findings between public-private pay comparisons based on jobs and those based on individual characteristics is that government pays less for the same jobs and may therefore attract 18 people who cannot obtain the same jobs in the private sector. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the pooled national data by sector. On average, public-sector workers are older and better educated than private-sector employees, overall and for each race and gender. A higher percentage of public sector than private sector employees holds bachelor's, masters', professional and doctoral degrees. Conversely, private-sector employees almost uniformly report working longer hours per week and more weeks per year (the exception is African American females' reported work hours).
Findings
Because earnings data is positively skewed, median rather than mean values are reported as a better measure of central tendency. Consistent with other research, publicsector employees have higher median earnings than private-sector employees (Borjas, 2002b ). Once we control for differences in human capital, however, SLG employees as a group earn a less than comparable employees in the private sector in all three time periods (Table 3) . Methods 1 and 2 generate fairly similar and stable estimates across this period. Method 1 suggests that SLG employees as a group were underpaid by 4.1% in 1990 and 2005 and by 5.9% in 2000. Method 2 suggests slightly smaller differences, with point estimates between 3.7% and 5.3% and no trend. The pay disadvantage is highest for white non-Hispanic men and Asian men, who earn about 10% and 6% less in SLG than private employment, respectively. The point estimates range from 8.9% to 11.9% for white men and from 3.7% to 9.4% for Asian men with no obvious trends.
[Insert Table 2 about each group of SLG employees has higher expected pay in the sector, and the expected advantage is 9% to 12% for white women, blacks, and Latinos. Table 4 presents ordinary least squares regression equations for the natural logarithm of earnings for the profit and SLG sectors nationally, with the regression coefficients converted to percentage differences. As expected, earnings rise with both education and work experience, with the significant coefficient on experience-squared indicating that earnings increase at a decreasing rate with experience. Education is more highly rewarded in the private sector. At lower educational levels, an additional year raises expected earnings 3.8% in the private sector and 3.6% in SLGs. The additional impact of a degree, beyond what would be expected based simply on the number of years of education, is markedly higher in the private sector: by 13 percentage points for a bachelor's degree (29% versus 16%), by 20 percentage points for a master's degree, and by 22 percentage points for a professional degree. Doctorates raise expected earnings by about 61% in both sectors.
[Insert Table 4 about here] As expected, white males make more than comparably educated and experienced women and minorities in the same occupation and state, but the disparities are substantially smaller in the public sector. The gap is 9 percentage points smaller in the SLG sector for white females, for instance; they make 25% less than comparable white males in the private sector but only 16% less in the public sector. Similarly, SLG gaps relative to white males are 9 percentage points smaller for black and Latino males and Asian females, and 11 percentage points smaller for black and Latino females.
Using method 1, Table 5 shows public-private pay differences for comparable employees for all fifty states, first for all employees collectively and then separately for Asian Americans earned significantly less in the SLG sector in 18 states and significantly more only in New York. All but two of the insignificant differences also suggested that Asians earn less in the public sector. All but two of the Asians' SLG pay disadvantages were at least 10% (again, partly due to sample size), and five were estimated to be at least 20%. Indeed, Asian-Americans appear to pay larger penalties for SLG employment than white males, which helps explain why only 11.5% of Asians report working in the public sector, compared to 15.5% of the entire sample and 20.1% of blacks.
Discussion, Recommendations and Conclusion
In contrast to several prior studies by economists, we find little evidence that SLG employees are overpaid. Holding constant education, estimated work experience, occupation, location, race, and gender, SLG employees earned 4 to 6% less than comparable private sector workers in 1990, 2000, and 2005-06, whether we used a dummy variable or modified Oaxaca method. Neither method suggests that the SLGprivate pay disparity has widened or narrowed much since 1990.
We also confirmed previous findings that the size of the SLG-private pay disparity varies widely with race/ethnicity and gender. Both methods indicate that white and Asian American men consistently have lower expected earnings in the SLG 23 sector, with disadvantages of at least 10% for white men and at least 5% for Asian men in most years. White and Asian women probably also have lower expected earnings in the SLG sector, but the findings are not consistent and the disadvantage is probably only about 2%. In contrast, black and Latino men and women are generally expected to earn more in SLGs, though the advantage is typically less than 5%.
Although Kroncke and Long (1998) and Llorens (2008) have also estimated state variation in public-private pay disparities, both studies have limitations. By using the much smaller CPS rather than Census data, Llorens must accept large standard errors for his disparity estimates, especially when he derives estimates for each state for each year. Much of the variation that he tries to explain in the later stage of his work is probably due to sampling error. He, at least, yields reasonably consistent estimates for his male and female models -the size of the male and female public-private pay data. We want to test the reliability of our estimates before testing models to explain the variation. We did do one sensitivity analysis of our state-level estimates: we ran the same models without controlling for occupation. This lowered expected SLG pay -the average SLG-private pay difference was negative for all groups when we omitted occupation from the regressions. State-level estimates for the same group correlated .90 to .97 with and without occupations in the model.
Our tentative conclusions based on the analysis to this point are that most SLGs pay less than private firms in the same state for similar workers. This is especially true for white men and Asians. Blacks and Latinos earn more in the public than private sector, however, though that conclusion doesn't appear to hold for blacks in the South.
All of these conclusions are limited by uncertainty about the appropriate way to estimate public-private pay disparities. The debate over how to measure "equal work" in the two sectors, and over how to handle occupations which are nearly unique to the public sector, continues. Economists' human capital approach, comparing equivalent workers rather than equivalent work, offers an attractive alternative, as nearly appropriate data are far more widely available to scholars to test general propositions.
The control variables available provide only rough comparability of workers across sectors, however, and knowing what control variables to include is difficult. Do race and sex dummies proxy for real differences in human capital, or do they legitimize racial and sexual discrimination in the private sector? Do occupational controls make the work done more comparable across sectors, or do they legitimize different pay structures for men's and women's work? Should we try to establish whether all workers could earn about the same amount in the public and private sectors, or should we focus only on the 25 people who actually work for SLGs and see whether they would earn more or less in the private sector?
Our next steps are to generate Method 1, Method 2, and Method 3 estimates of SLG-private pay disparities by state for all three data sets (1990 PUMS, 2000 PUMS, and 2001 for all employees and by race/gender. We will next estimate how much the method affects the disparity estimates and how strongly estimates are correlated across methods and years. Once we achieve sufficiently reliable estimates, we will model the explanation for cross-time and cross-state variation in public-private pay differences.
Principles of good governance require effective, efficient and equitable governmental operations; SLG compensation policies impact all objectives.
Substantially overpaying public employees wastes public revenues, while underpaying employees decreases morale, increases turnover, hampers recruitment of qualified applicants and erodes delivery of essential governmental services (Berman et al., 2006) .
Issues of efficiency and effectiveness aside, the government, as the expression of sovereignty, should lead by example in best employment practices. As such, pay equity must also be a major concern of public managers. Accurate information on pay differences by race and gender facilitates equitable decision making. Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of earnings in the previous year. All models also include 50 dummy variables for state of residence, 6 dummy variables for year of earnings and 22 dummy variables for broad occupational categories. The constant is in dollars. Florida -1.6** -6.6** -4.0** 8.0** 7.3** -6.6* 20379 49 Georgia -13.3** -18.7** -13.8** -6.1** -18.6** -8.6 11410 20 Hawaii -5.4** -11.5** -8.8* .
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